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CROSS-CITY INEQUALITIES: DETERMINANTS OF RENTAL HOUSING QUALITY IN 
BLOOMINGTON, IL 
Lindsey Haines 
Abstract: It seems that every city has a “bad side of town.”  In Bloomington, Illinois, a community more 
affluent than average, does this bad side still exist?  The city’s historical Westside, once a thriving working 
class area has now deteriorated into a blighted area.  This area suffers from building code violations, 
inadequate public infrastructure, vacancies, etc.  In addition, the area suffers from decaying rental properties.  
This study builds on previous literature to test the comparative effects of property characteristics, 
neighborhood characteristics, and landlord characteristics on the quality of rental housing on the Westside 
and in the city as a whole.  Using data from the US Census and City of Bloomington, this study utilizes an 
ordered probit model revealing the stark difference on the city’s Westside. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Every city has its so-called “bad side of town.”  The question is why.  Why have some areas 
deteriorated while others have thrived?  Compared to the country as a whole, Bloomington, 
Illinois has a high median income.  However, this relative prosperity does not prevail across all 
areas of the city.  Bloomington’s Westside, a once stable working class area, has deteriorated into a 
blighted neighborhood.  This area suffers from building code violations, inadequate public 
infrastructure, vacancies, high business turnover, lack of commercial facilities, and a high crime 
rate.  In addition, the area suffers from decaying rental properties.  What were once large Victorian 
single-family homes were divided into rental properties during the 1930s. Although these 
properties violated the building code, for many years they were well maintained by owner-
occupant landlords.  During the 1970s, due to the introduction of cheap repair materials and 
building trade standards, many of these properties began to deteriorate.  At the same time, many 
owner-occupant landlords sold off their properties to absentee and resident landlords.1 Today, the 
quality of the Westside’s properties is much lower than the City of Bloomington as a whole.  The 
rental market literature points to several important determinants of rental property quality such as 
property characteristics, neighborhoods, tenants, and landlords.  Thus, in order to correct the 
deficiencies in West Bloomington’s rental properties and in the city as a whole, knowing the source 
of the problems is critical.  Fortunately, with the City of Bloomington’s Rental Inspection Program 
and organizations like the West Bloomington Revitalization Partnership, these deficiencies can be 
corrected with the proper policy enactments. This study will build on previous literature using 
regression analysis and descriptive statistics to discover which characteristics have the greatest 
effect on rental property quality in order to inform appropriate policy recommendations. 
 
                                                          
1 “West Bloomington Neighborhood Plan,” West Bloomington Task Force, (2008). 
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Deborah Halperin and Heather Paul of the West Bloomington 
Revitalization Project for all of their guidance and assistance with this project. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Because they do not own their dwellings, renting tenants have only partial control over the 
quality of their housing.  Therefore, understanding the decision-making process of landlords is 
essential to understanding rental property quality.  Although little empirical literature deals 
specifically with the effects of landlords on the qualities of their properties, a great deal of 
theoretical literature deals with landlord maintenance decisions.  Most of the literature explains 
landlord decision making as a function of economic incentives. 
 According to the widely cited model developed by L. L. Dildine and F. A. Massey, housing 
quality is a dynamic process driven principally by owner maintenance decisions.2  Furthermore, in 
this model, the rationally acting property owner seeks to maximize the present value of the 
property, which is a function of rents, expenditure on maintenance, and scrap value.  Here, 
maintenance costs depend both on the amount of inputs purchased and on the initial quality of the 
building.  This theory indicates that landlords decide how much to invest in their properties by 
equating discounted future benefits from maintenance with the current cost of the maintenance.  
Therefore, conditions that decrease returns to investment, like the age of the property, can account 
for declining property quality. However, through maintenance expenditure, landlords can arrest 
this depreciation due to age.  The landlord’s choice is whether to allow their property to 
deteriorate or to maintain its current state.  Landlords will choose the option that maximizes the 
expected present value of the property.  Therefore, the probability of maintenance depends on the 
profitability of the alternative, which is no maintenance. 
 D. S. Elliot, M.A. Quinn, and R.E. Mendelson build on the Dildine and Massey model by 
incorporating neighborhood quality as well as inputs and initial housing quality.3  They use the 
aforementioned model to study housing deterioration in St. Louis.  This study focuses on the how 
neighborhood conditions affect the profitability of investments.  First of all, the condition of a 
neighborhood affects the rent a landlord can charge for their properties.  Therefore, a landlord 
must consider the rent charged for surrounding substitutable units when deciding what to charge 
tenants.  These considerations create rent ceilings, wherein a landlord’s rent cannot exceed a 
certain price without sacrificing competitiveness.  This ceiling means landlords will only improve 
their properties to the point where the maintenance costs equal this maximum rent. 
 Furthermore, Robin Dubin studies the maintenance decision of landlords, building on the 
previous two studies, but incorporating an uncertain expectations framework.4  Rather than 
assuming future rents, input prices, and deterioration rates are known for certain, Dubin makes 
the more reasonable assumption that landlords take uncertainty into consideration.  Specifically, 
                                                          
2 L.L. Dildine and F.A. Massey, “Dynamic Model of Private Incentives to Housing Mainenance,” Southern 
Economic Journal 40, no. 4 (1974): 631-639. 
3 D.S. Elliot, M.A. Quinn, R.E. Mendelson, “Maintenance Behavior of Large-Scale Landlords and Theories of 
Neighborhood Succession,” Real Estate Economics 13, no. 4 (1985): 424-445. 
4 R.A. Dubin, “Maintenance Decisions of Absentee Landlords under Uncertainty,” Journal of Housing 
Economics 7 (1998): 144-164. 
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because property quality depends on neighborhood quality, which changes over time, landlords 
must consider some level of uncertainty regarding future neighborhood quality.  Dubin explains 
that neighborhood quality is exogenous and is beyond the individual landlord’s control.  For 
example, the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents affect neighborhood quality.  Other 
attributes such as crime, schools, vacant buildings, etc. affect neighborhood quality as well.  
Therefore, drawing on the original Dildine and Massey model, since future neighborhood quality 
is uncertain, future revenues are uncertain as well.  This uncertainty means the profitability of 
maintenance depends on the probability of neighborhood decline.  She finds that because 
neighborhood quality and property quality are intertwined, landlords’ pessimism regarding 
neighborhood deterioration will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  As landlords chose not to 
invest because they predict that a neighborhood will decline, their decision not to invest 
contributes to the problem.   
 In a more empirically motivated study, Frank Porell looks at differences in housing quality 
based on landlord type.5  The focus of his study is to differentiate between the quality of owner-
occupant landlord properties and absentee landlord properties.  Porell hypothesizes that owner-
occupant landlords maintain their units in better condition and provide higher quality services 
than their absentee counterparts.  The paper offers several theories to support this hypothesis.  
First of all, owner-occupant landlords may be more aware of deficiencies, making them more 
disposed to make repairs.  On the other hand their constant presence may also serve a police-like 
function by deterring physical abuse by tenants.  Also, the “pride in dwelling” theory suggests that 
owner-occupant landlords may internalize the negative externalities associated with poorly 
maintained units.  Specifically, ill-kept properties may make the community less appealing.  
Owner-occupant landlords may also have a comparative advantage in tenant selection: They may 
be able to choose tenants with a lower propensity to damage property.  The study uses an ordered 
probit model, incorporating building, neighborhood, tenant, and landlord characteristics.  Overall, 
the study finds that landlord residency does affect property quality, except in multi-unit 
structures. 
 George Sternlieb offers another look into the influence of specific landlords characteristics 
on the quality of rental properties, taking an in-depth look at tenement landlords in Newark, NJ.6  
In this study, the main goal was to define the optimum bundle of “carrots and sticks” with which 
to secure the upgrade of slum properties. First of all, the study finds that the weakened market 
structure of rental housing in slum areas has created high vacancy rates, reduced maintenance, and 
weak resale values.  He also focuses a great deal on how different landlord types make decisions.  
The study finds that landlords’ residency affects the quality of rental properties.  The results of this 
study, similar to Porell, show that owner-occupant landlords are far superior to their absentee 
counterparts.  Sternlieb says, “It is the only factor that produces the degree of close supervision 
                                                          
5 F.W. Porell, “One Man’s Ceiling is Another Man’s Floor: Landlord/Manager Residency and Housing 
Condition,” Land Economics 61, no. 2 (1985): 106-117. 
 
6 George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord  (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966). 
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required for good maintenance of properties.”7  Furthermore, the study finds that the degree of 
non-involvement between landlord and property increases with the geographic distance between 
the landlord and the property.  The study also finds that many absentee landlords acquire their 
properties through inheritance, meaning they have little economic connection to the properties. 
Analyzing the scale of a landlord’s operation, he finds mixed results.  On one hand, many large-
scale landlords tend to specialize in slum-ownership.  In essence, the worst housing areas have the 
highest concentration of major owners.  Anecdotally, he finds that many large-scale landlords have 
an impersonal connection to their properties.  One slum-lord says:   
As soon as I bought the parcel, and I bought it as part of a package, I looked around 
to try to get rid of it.  It was in lousy condition, and simply wasn’t worth keeping.  It 
took me the better part of four years to sell the parcel in question…It wasn’t worth 
my while to improve the parcel since I planned on selling it.8 
On the other hand, large-scale landlords also have economies of scale when it comes to 
maintenance.  Sternlieb finds that many professional landlords employ a full-time maintenance 
crew.  Furthermore, the study finds that large-scale landlords also have better access to financing.  
Thus overall, the scale of a landlord could affect property quality in either a positive or negative 
way. 
However, the literature also suggests that non-economic factors may also play a role in 
landlord maintenance decisions.  H. S. Anderson reviews many studies from Denmark and several 
other countries.  He finds that many landlords have non-economic ties to their properties as well as 
the obvious economic incentives.9  Landlords may feel what Anderson calls “social motives” that 
make landlords feel morally obligated to appease their tenants.  Furthermore, a Danish survey 
shows that social motives alongside economic motives affect rehabilitation decisions.  Anderson 
finds that landlords most likely to cite moral obligations as a maintenance motives  are small-scale, 
non-professional landlords. 
John Gilderbloom finds similar results to Anderson when analyzing the U.S. rental housing 
market.10  He divides landlords into two distinctive categories: the large-scale professional and the 
small-scale amateur.  He justifies distinguishing landlords by scale saying, “Another way of 
looking at the importance of scale is to identify the point at which an investor must cease being a 
part-time landlord and concentrate full-time on his holdings” (158).  The study finds that the cost 
of doing business is generally higher for professionals, as the scale of operations requires hiring a 
full-time work force to manage and make repairs.  However, small-scale landlords may also face 
high operating costs if they contract maintenance rather than doing it themselves.  Furthermore, 
                                                          
7 Ibid., xiii.  
8 Ibid.  
9 H.S. Anderson, “Motives for Investments in Housing Rehabilitation among Private Landlords under Rent 
Control,” Housing Studies 13, no.2 (1998): 177-200. 
10 John Gilderbloom, “Social Factors Affecting Landlords in the Determination of Rent,” Urban Life 14, no. 2 
(1985): 155-179. 
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the study finds that small-scale amateurs tend to give great weight to social and personal 
considerations, whereas their large-scale counterparts respond to economic incentives.  Small-scale 
landlords are more influenced by face-to-face contact with tenants because they often know their 
tenants.  Large-scale landlords, on the other hand, may never meet their tenants, as many of them 
hire management companies.  Gilderbloom also looks at tenant qualities.  He finds that income 
level and employment are the most important qualities for tenants: higher income and employed 
tenants have a lower probability of missing payments and can better adjust to rent increases. 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
Following the literature, and specifically, Porell’s model, property quality should depend 
on property characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, tenant characteristics, and landlords 
characteristics: Quality = Property + Neighborhood+ Tenant + Landlord.11 
Property Quality  
Due to the complex aspects of housing, quality can be considered an unobservable variable.  We 
can observe indicators that are associated with quality levels, but the concept itself is 
immeasurable.  However, many studies justify the use of quality indexes.12  A housing quality 
index weights and compiles quality indicators such as plumbing, heat source, wiring, paint, 
appearance, etc. 
Property Characteristics 
 As implied by multiple studies, age is an important factor in property quality. 13  Again, as a 
property ages it becomes more expensive to maintain.  For example, repairs in a ten year old 
property may entail a new coat of paint, while repairs in a seventy year old property may entail 
new siding. 
 Controlling for capital inputs is an important consideration as well.  Porell and Sternlieb 
use rooms per dwelling, units per structure, and square footage to proxy for capital inputs.14  
However, the literature provides no indication of the predicted effect of these inputs on quality. 
Neighborhood Characteristics 
Beginning with Sternlieb and Elliot et al, neighborhood characteristics are also an important factor 
in housing quality.  Generally, landlords do not maintain their properties in decayed areas because 
they do not see returns to their investments, as suggested by the literature.15  According to 
Sternlieb, the racial composition of the neighborhood also tends to negatively impact rental 
                                                          
11 Porell, “One Man’s Ceiling,” 106-117. 
12 Porell, “One Man’s Ceiling,” 106-117; Dubin, “Maintenance Decisions,” 144-174; J.L. Goodman “Causes 
and Indicators of Housing Quality,” Social Indicators Research 5 (1977): 195-210. 
13 Porell, “One Man’s Ceiling,” 106-117; Dubin, “Maintenance Decisions,” 144-174; Elliot, “Maintenance 
Behavior,” 424-445; Dildine and Massey, “Private Incentives,” 631-639. 
14 Porell, “One Man’s Ceiling” 106-117; Sternlieb, “The Tenement Landlord.” 
15 Sternlieb, “The Tenement Landlord”; Elliot,“Maintenance Behavior,” 424-445. 
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quality, keeping in mind however, that this study was completed before the Housing 
Discrimination Act of 1968.16 
Tenant Characteristics 
Following Porell (1985) and Gilderbloom (1985) tenants’ characteristics are also an important 
consideration.  Both studies cite tenant income and employment status as important factors.  To 
investigate instances of housing discrimination, Porell also includes the race and number of 
children as important tenant characteristics. 
Landlord Characteristics 
As the literature suggests, landlord characteristics are very important indicators of property 
quality.  First of all, the residency of the landlord may affect how they maintain their properties.  
Resident landlords may be more aware of deficiencies and may internalize the externalities of poor 
property quality.  Porell and Sternlieb both find that owner-occupant landlords maintain their 
properties better than absentee landlords.17  However, only about 15% of landlords nationwide are 
owner-occupants, a large decrease from decades past (US Census).  Therefore, the more common 
residency distinction of a landlord is residency, inside or outside the community, a factor that may 
affect quality in a similar way. 
 Moreover, Sternlieb, Gilderbloom, and Anderson find that the scale of a landlord may also 
affect the quality of their properties.18  However, the literature predicts mixed results.  On one 
hand, large-scale landlords may benefit from economies of scale and therefore be more efficient in 
maintaining properties.  On the other hand, small-scale landlords maybe more in-tune with the 
needs of their tenants and feel a moral obligation to maintain their properties. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Model Specification 
Following the empirical design of Porell, this study uses an ordered probit model.19  Because the 
dependent variable is ordinal and multichotomousan ordered probit model is used.  The general 
specification is: use subscripts to make the math more clear link(γij)=θj−[β1xi1+β2xi2+...+βpxiJ] 
where link() is the link function, θjis the cumulative probability of the jth category for the ith case, 
qj is the threshold for the jth category, p is the number of regression coefficients, xi1…xip are the 
values of the predictors for the ith case, and b1…bp are the regression coefficients.  Because the 
dependent variable, housing quality, is skewed towards higher values, this model uses the 
complimentary log-log link function to correct for the skew.  Importantly, the coefficients given by 
the regression are hard to interpret because the model predicts cumulative probabilities that are 
influenced by the link function.  However, the model will indicate the significance level and sign of 
the variables, the two most important pieces of information for the purposes of this study. 
                                                          
16 Sternlieb, “The Tenement Landlord.” 
17 Porell, “One Man’s Ceiling,” 106-117; Sternlieb, “The Tenement Landlord.” 
18 Sternlieb, “The Tenement Landlord”; Anderson, “Motives for Investments,” 177-200.; Gilderbloom, “Social 
Factors,” 155-179. 
19 Porell, “One Man’s Ceiling,” 106-117. 
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This study will use the model to compare two different data sets.  The first model uses a 
random sample of 300 rental properties from the entire City of Bloomington.  The second model 
includes all 225 rental properties in the West Bloomington Plan Area.  In the model, housing 
quality is a function of property characteristics (age, square-footage per unit, and 
attached/detached), neighborhood characteristics (median household income and racial 
composition), and landlord characteristics (residency and scale):   
Quality = Property + Neighborhood + Landlord 
Ideally, the model would also include proxies for individual tenant characteristics; however 
individual tenant data was not available for this study.  Furthermore, the model for the West Side 
will not include neighborhood characteristics in the equation, as all of the observations are from 
the same homogenous block group.  Specifically, the model takes the following form: 
 
Bloomington Model:  Qn= ß0 + ß1AGE+ ß2SQFTperUNIT+ ß3TYPE+ ß4HHINC + ß5RACE+ ß6RENT + 
ß7LLRES + ß8LLUNITS+E 
 
Westside Model:  Qn= ß0 + ß1AGE+ ß2SQFTperUNIT+ ß3TYPE+ ß4HHINC +ß7LLRES + 
ß8LLUNITS+E. 
 
Wherein, Qn is the quality of the property n (1 is the lowest, 4 is the highest), ß1AGE is the age of 
the property as of 2009, ß2SQFT is the is the square-footage per unit of the property,  ß3TYPE is the 
type of property (1 if attached, 0 if detached),  ß4HHINC is the median household income of the 
property’s respective block group, ß5RACE is the proportion of white residents in the property’s 
respective block group,  ß7LLRES is the residency of the property’s landlord (1 if in Bloomington-
Normal, 0 if outside Bloomington-Normal),  ß8LLSCALE is the scale of the property’s landlord (1 
if they own multiple properties, 0 if they own a single property) and E is the error term with a 
mean of zero. 
 The dependent variable measuring housing quality is the City of Bloomington’s Rental Inspection 
Program Index as defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
Specification of Dependent Variable 
Class 
Value in 
Model 
Definition 
A 4 
The building is in excellent condition and has minor or no violations of 
applicable city codes. 
 
B 3 
The building is in good condition and has minor violations of applicable 
city codes and the violations do not pose an immediate threat of danger 
to life, health, and safety of the occupants. 
 
C 2 
The building is in sound condition and has major or minor violations of 
applicable city codes that do not pose an immediate threat of danger to 
the life, health, and safety of the occupants. 
 
D 1 
The building has critical violations and is either unsafe, contains unsafe 
equipment, is unfit for human occupancy or is unlawful. 
 
Source: Registered Rental Property Class and Date of Issue City of Bloomington Rental 
Inspection Program. 18 Aug 2009. 10 Oct 2009. <http://www.cityblm.org/library/bs/pdfs/rpt 
ActiveRRCurrentClass.pdf> . 
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The independent variables come from both the Bloomington Assessors’ Office and the 2000 
United States Census.20  Looking at Table 2, based on theory, the age of the property, the residency 
of the landlord (outside the community), the scale (large-scale), and the type (attached), should 
negatively impact quality.  The median household income and race (percent white) should 
positively impact quality.  The literature does not provide a predicted sign for square-footage per 
unit.  The property and landlord characteristics were obtained from the Bloomington Assessor and 
the neighborhood characteristics were obtained from the 2000 US Census. 
TABLE 2 
Specification of Independent Variables 
Variable Definition Expected Sign Source 
AGE Age of the structure (as of 2009) - Bloomington Assessor 
SQFT 
Square footage per unit (as of last 
inspection) 
? Bloomington Assessor 
RACE* 
Proportion of white residents in unit’s 
respective block group (2000) 
+ US Census 
HHINC* 
Median household income of unit’s 
respective block group (2000) 
+ US Census 
TYPE 
Type of unit 
1 if attached, 0 if detached 
- Bloomington Assessor 
LLRES 
Residence of unit’s landlord (as of last 
inspection) 
1 if in Bloomington-Normal, 0 if not 
- Bloomington Assessor 
LLSCALE 
Number of properties owned in 
sample 
1 if multiple, 0 if single 
- Bloomington Assessor 
* Not included in West Bloomington model 
                                                          
20 “City of Bloomington Property Assessment,” Property Database Assessor’s Office. City of Bloomington 
Township 10 Oct 2009. <http://www.wevaluebloomington.org>.; American Factfinder, “Housing Indicators” 
United States Census. 10 Oct 2009. <http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en>. 
 
 
 10 Res Publica 
 
RESULTS 
Looking solely at the descriptive statistics in Table 3, there are clear differences between the 
City of Bloomington and the Westside.  First of all, the Westside is of lower income, a higher 
minority composition, and is less educated.  Strikingly, the average age of the housing stock on the 
Westside is seventy-five years older than that of Bloomington as a whole.  Furthermore, the quality 
of Westside rental properties is clearly lower than Bloomington as a whole. Although the majority 
of properties in both areas are of either A or B quality, the Westside has nearly 30 percent less A 
quality rental properties. 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Bloomington Westside 
Median HH Income $46,496/year $23,845/year 
HS Diploma 92% 57% 
Density of Minority Population 15% 29.5% 
Avg. Age of Housing Stock 35 years 110 years 
Quality A 69.4% 41.9% 
Quality B 19.8% 35.2% 
Quality C 6.0% 17.4% 
Quality D 4.8% 5.5% 
Condemned Properties 26 11 
LL Res in BN 69.8% 80.4% 
LL Res out BN 30.2% 19.6% 
LL Owning Single Unit 57.5% 36.2% 
LL Owning Multi Units 42.5% 63.8% 
Attached Unit 53.6% 44.2% 
Detached Unit 46.4% 55.8% 
Source: American Factfinder. “Housing Indicators” United States Census. 10 Oct 2009. 
<http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en>. 
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This finding means that almost 60 percent of properties on the Westside are in need of 
repair work.  Furthermore, of the twenty-six condemned properties in Bloomington, eleven of the 
properties are on the Westside.  Looking at landlord characteristics, although theory predicts that a 
blighted area like the Westside should have more non-resident landlords, actually, the Westside 
has more resident landlords than the city as a whole.  Also contrary to theory, the Westside has 
more large-scale landlords than the city as a whole and has more attached units than the city as a 
whole. 
TABLE 4 
Regression Results 
Variable BBloomington  BWestside  
AGE -.016* -.015** 
SQFT .000 .000 
TYPE -.031 .484* 
RACE .044* - 
HHINC -6.233E-6 - 
LLRES .220 .176 
LLSCALE -.044 .081 
Pseudo R2 .163 .065 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
Looking at the regression results, as shown in Table 4, the model neither for Bloomington 
nor for the Westside have high explanatory power.  However, when dealing with an ordinal 
model, it is important to note that the pseudo R2 values are more useful for the fits of models than 
for dictating their explanatory power.  Therefore, in this case, the Bloomington model explains 
more than the Westside model.  Both models are significant at the .001 level.  Looking at the 
coefficients, the age of a rental property has a significant negative effect on quality for both 
Bloomington and the Westside.  Specifically, older properties have a higher probability of being in 
a poorer category of housing quality.  Furthermore, the type of property, whether attached or 
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detached, has a significant positive effect on quality on in the Westside model.  This coefficient 
indicates that if a property is attached, the probability that the property is in a higher quality 
category is higher.  However, property type is not significant for Bloomington as a whole.  The 
race variable is also significant: properties in block groups with a higher proportion of white 
residents have a higher probability of being in a higher category of quality.  Importantly, neither 
landlord residency nor landlord scale significantly impacts housing quality, disproving the initial 
hypotheses. 
 Because the Westside is classified as a slum/blighted area, according to the literature, there 
may be “slumlords” that own a large share of the properties.  Looking at the breakdown of the 
landlords on the Westside as illustrated by Figure 1, four landlords control 30.2 percent of the 
properties.  Furthermore, all of these landlords are local landlords.  From Chart 1, it is clear that 
only Shakman Enterprises have a great concentration of low quality properties. Shakman owns 
13.8 percent of the properties on the Westside and 46 percent of the grade C properties.  A 
difference of means test shows that the average quality of Shakman’s properties (2.54) is 
significantly different from the mean of all the Westside properties (3.24). 
FIGURE 1 
Frequency of Property Types of Westside Landlords 
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This result shows that Shakman Enterprises’ properties are of significantly lower quality than 
those owned by other Westside landlords. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the model yields interesting results.  First of all, neither hypothesis holds: both 
landlord residency and landlord scale are insignificant.  This finding indicates that neither 
landlord characteristic (residency nor scale) significantly affects the quality of their properties.  
Although the hypotheses are incorrect, the model yields other important findings.   
Butzirus    Hafner     Miller       Shakman 
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As predicted, the age of a property negatively impacts its quality.  Clearly, in Bloomington 
and on the Westside, landlords are choosing not to maintain older properties.  This finding follows 
the previously stated theories of neighborhood decline and disinvestment.  As previously 
mentioned, as a property ages, repair work becomes more intense and thus more expensive.  For 
example, whereas maintenance on a ten-year-old property may only entail a new coat of paint, 
maintenance on a one hundred-year-old property could entail entirely new plumbing.  However, 
because age and rent are highly correlated at a significant r-value of -.5, in general, tenants are in 
fact paying less for older units.  Thus the lower quality caused by age is reflected in the rental 
price. 
For West Bloomington, attached properties are of a significantly higher quality than 
detached units.  This finding refutes the literature, which predicts that attached units should be of 
lower quality.  Perhaps in the case of Bloomington’s Westside landlords owning multiple-unit 
properties can exercise economies of scale and purchase cheaper inputs than landlords owning 
single-unit structures can. 
Most importantly, the significance of the race variable indicates the presence of 
discrimination in Bloomington, as the proportion of white residents in a block group positively 
affects the quality of the rental properties.  Because the model controls for property characteristics 
and the median household income of the property’s block group, this effect is purely due to race.  
Housing theory offers several explanations for this phenomenon.  First of all, Bloomington 
landlords may be discriminating against minority tenants, by either refusing to accept them as 
tenants for higher quality units, or by failing to maintain properties in higher-minority areas.  
Either practice is a form of housing discrimination, which is illegal under the Fair Housing Act of 
1968. 
In addition, a difference of means test reveals the possible presence of a “slumlord” in West 
Bloomington.  Although most of the larger-scale owners have sufficiently maintained properties, 
Shakman’s properties are of a significantly lower quality than the other landlords. 
In the beginning, this study aimed to explain the how landlord characteristics affect the 
quality of rental properties.  However, after examining the data, the model finds that property 
characteristics (age and attachment) and neighborhood characteristics (racial composition) 
overwhelm landlord characteristics in the case of Bloomington, IL.  Moreover, the findings offer 
several policy suggestions.  First of all, because older properties are of significantly worse quality, 
the local government and community organizations such as the West Bloomington Revitalization 
Partnership (WBRP) should encourage the rehabilitation of older properties.  An important step 
for the WBRP should be to establish the organization as a Community Housing Development 
Organization, a designation through the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  This 
designation would allow the WBRP to use HUD block grant funds to purchase and rehabilitate 
deteriorating housing.  Furthermore, the City of Bloomington should also take action to improve 
their rental inspection program.  Perhaps more frequent inspections or harsher penalties would 
encourage landlords to fix problems with grade C and D properties.  The City should also work to 
enforce the Housing Discrimination Act.  This study implies that minority tenants are being 
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segregated into lower quality properties than their white counterparts of the same income level, an 
illegal practice.  Furthermore, the City should also investigate why Shakman’s properties are of 
such a low quality compared to the other Westside landlords.  Considering the large number of 
properties this landlord owns, improving their holdings alone would have an enormous impact on 
the housing quality on the Westside. 
In all, although Bloomington as a whole is a more affluent community than average, 
pockets of blight still exist.  Using the results of this study, perhaps the City of Bloomington and 
other community organizations will take the necessary steps to improve the quality of the rental 
housing stock throughout the city in general, and specifically on the Westside. After all, regardless 
of a person’s race or income, everyone deserves to have a roof over their head, a safe, well-
maintained roof that is. 
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APPENDIX 1: Source of Property Characteristics 
Property Characteristics 
Assessment Page    Ownership History     Assessment History     Permit History    Picture     New 
Search    Home  
ID:   41  14-33-358-002   
Name:   BUTZIRUS, BRAD L & MARTHA E 
Address:   706 W GRAHAM 
Bldg No:   1 
Lot Size  50 X 109 Grade  D 
Foundation  Brick Year Built  1910 
Basement  Part Crawl Eff Age  43 
SF Fin Bsmnt  0 Phy Dep  50 
SF Crawl  617 Funct Obs  0 
SF Slab  0 Econ Obs  0 
SF Fin Attic  0 Porch  OFP 
Air Conditioning  0 Porch SF  80 
Fireplaces  0 # Decks  0 
Total Rooms  0 Deck SF  0 
Bedrooms  0 Pool  No Pool 
Baths  1 Bath Pool SF  0 
GFLA  822 Year Pool Blt  0 
Total SF  822 # Tennis Cts  0 
Landlord 
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Story Type  1 Story Amenities  None 
Ext Walls Alum/Vinyl Garage Type  No Garage 
Roof  Roll Garage SF  0 
Lot SF  5429 
 
 
Assessment Page    Ownership History     Assessment History     Permit History    Picture     New 
Search    Home  
 
APPENDIX 2: RENTAL PROPERTY REGISTER SAMPLE PAGE 
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APPENDIX 3: Map of West Bloomington Plan Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4: Map of Block Group Divisions 
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APPENDIX 5: List of Condemned Properties 
 
